A Framework for Categorizing Disruptive Cyber Activity and Assessing its Impact by Harry, Charles
 
	
A Framework for Categorizing 
Disruptive Cyber Activity and 
Assessing its Impact  
 
By Charles Harry, PhD 
 























		CISSM Working Paper | Categorizing Disruptive Cyber Activity          2
Abstract 
 
While significant media attention has been given to the volume and range of cyber attacks, the 
inability to measure and categorize disruptive events has complicated efforts of policy makers to 
push comprehensive responses that address the range of cyber activity. While organizations and 
public officials have spent significant time and resources attempting to grapple with the complex 
nature of these threats, a systematic and comprehensive approach to categorize and measure 
disruptive attacks remains elusive. This paper addresses this issue by differentiating between 
exploitive and disruptive cyber events, proposes a formal method to categorize five types of 
disruptive events, and measures their impact along three dimensions of analysis. Scope, 
magnitude, and duration of disruptive cyber events are analyzed to locate each event on a Cyber 
Disruption Index (CDI) so organizations and policymakers can estimate the aggregated effect of 
a malicious act aimed at impacting their operations. Using the five different event classes and the 
CDI estimation method makes it easier for organizations and policy makers to disaggregate a 
complex topic, contextualize and process individual threats to their network, target where 
increased investment can reduce the risk of specific disruptive cyber events, and distinguish 
between events that represent a private-sector problem from those that merit a more serious 
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Introduction 
 
The reliance of modern life on the large number of interconnected networks of computers, 
infrastructure, and sensors has made the threat of disruption a growing concern among business 
leaders and policy makers. Network security is increasingly seen as a strategic vulnerability as a 
growing number of corporate intrusions are reported. In fact, in 2014 over 1,541 breaches to 
company networks were identified.1 These breaches affect customer privacy, confidence in a 
company’s ability to protect core intellectual property, and an organization’s essential 
operations.2 Large numbers of intrusions have also occurred into government networks, with 
recent high-profile breaches including a significant compromise at the Office of Personal 
Management.3  
 
As both the private and public sectors grapple with the problem of cyber “attack,” disagreement 
remains regarding what can and should be done about the problem. This confusion reflects lack 
of clarity regarding the threat itself, which in part originates from the lack of precision in how we 
categorize and measure the range of disruptive cyber events. For example, a hacker takeover of a 
government social media account would not be nearly as disruptive as deleting the files on more 
than 30,000 computers in the internal network of that same organization. Individuals, 
organizations, and policy makers cannot decide how serious the problem is, what they should be 
most concerned about, and how much they should be willing to pay (in money, decreased 
privacy, efficiency, and flexibility) to prevent, defend against, or recover from a “cyber attack.”  
 
While some measures exist to quantify the vulnerability posed from malware and computer 
exploits, there is currently no approach to quantify the relative differences between or to estimate 
the total effect of disruptive events.4 To address this gap, I first differentiate between computer 
exploitation and cyber disruption, then formalize a Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) that allows for 
a repeatable and logically consistent approach to estimating the magnitude of any disruptive 
cyber event based on its scope, magnitude, and duration. Leveraging the CDI, I establish 
taxonomy of five groups of cyber disruption defined by the tactics employed by a malicious 
actor. Organizations can use this framework to categorize and estimate the effects of a range of 
potential disruptive cyber threats, clarifying between attacks that can cripple critical operations 
from those that are merely a nuisance. Policy makers can also apply the approach in this paper to 
differentiate between cyber attacks that pose more serious concerns to the broader society 
thereby allowing for a deeper understanding of the threat posed and a means to identify the 
organizations and industries that may require additional oversight. 
 
 
Generic terms, understandable confusion  
 
Recent disruptive cyber events, including those at the Sony Corporation and Saudi Aramco, have 




3Davidson, J “ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/new-opm-data-breach-numbers-leave-federal-
employees-anguished-outraged/” 
4 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is the most widely used. For more information see: 
https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm 
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be taken.5 Policy makers, including President Obama, have spent considerable effort 
strengthening the U.S. ability to prevent or respond to such attacks.6 These events raise two 
important questions. First, which entities constitute part of critical infrastructure or are of such 
importance to the economy that the disruption of activity at that location would present 
significant social consequences? The second, which type of attacks or techniques should the 
people who run these entities be most concerned about and what should they be doing to reduce 
risk both to the organization itself and to the society that depends on it? Policy makers have 
expended significant attention on answering the first question, identifying though executive 
action and implementing through statute, requirements to address vulnerabilities in critical 
infrastructure.7 The second question is equally important but has received much less attention. 
 
While the government has worked to address cyber threats with dozens of initiatives in the past 
several years, the proposed solutions treat the threat as monolithic, ignoring the real differences 
in motivation, tactics, and impact to the targeted networks.8 Social media account compromises 
are lumped together with large-scale data breaches, which are muddled with potential core 
infrastructure disruptions. In fact the overuse of terms such as “cyber attack,” “cyber war,” 
“cyber terrorism,” or “cyber intrusion” creates a single category of event that fails to differentiate 
among the wide range of potential disruption scenarios. Typical of this problem is Valeriano and 
Maness’ 2012 article in Foreign Affairs, which uses both STUXNET and the FLAME tool as 
examples in their discussion concerning “cyberwarfare.” In fact, STUXNET is a tool leveraged 
to disrupt Iranian enrichment activity, whereas the FLAME toolset appears to be focused 
primarily on cyber espionage.9 Lumping these types of events together into a single category 
complicates both our understanding of any individual scenario and makes it impossible to 
compare and contrast differing espionage or disruptive events.   
 
This one size fits all definition does not allow businesses or governments to concentrate on 
defending and hardening the most important elements of their communications networks. The 
language describing a wide range of activities—from compromise of information to wholesale 
destruction of infrastructure equipment—is mixed up into a couple of terms that are often loosely 
thrown around. For example the term computer network exploitation is typically a variant of the 
following definition: 
    
“Computer network exploitation (CNE) is a technique through which computer networks 
are used to infiltrate target computers' networks to extract and gather intelligence data. It 
enables the exploitation of the individual computers and computer networks of an 
																																																								
5 Gallagher, S “Inside the wiper malware that brought Sony Pictures to its knees” http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/12/inside-




7  Executive Order 13636—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity; CSIS. “Cyber Legislation,” CSIS Technology and 
Public Policy Blog, June 17, 2011.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Valeriano and Maness, “The Fog of Cyberwar: Why the Threat Doesn’t Live up to the Hype”, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-11-21/fog-cyberwar, Foreign Affairs, August 2012; 
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99 
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external organization or country in order to collect any sensitive or confidential data, 
which is typically kept hidden and protected from the general public.”10 
 
This definition appears sensible and in line with the clandestine accruing of computing resources 
for purpose of financial or intelligence gain. However, popular media, organizations, and 
government officials have also used the term cyberwar or the more generic cyber attack to 
describe similar events. Reviewing a common definition: 
   
“A cyber attack is deliberate exploitation of computer systems, technology-dependent 
enterprises and networks. Cyber attacks use malicious code to alter computer code, logic 
or data, resulting in disruptive consequences that can compromise data and lead to 
cybercrimes, such as information and identity theft.”11 
 
The use of generic and duplicative terms when describing cyber activities has led to confusion 
over what constitutes a true threat to an organization’s operations and the inability to distinguish 
between often radically differing cyber events. Both computer exploitation and computer 
network attacks are important topics, but the inability to distinguish event types has made the 
task of specifying the scope and magnitude of disruptive events nearly impossible. This paper 
defines events that seek to impact an organization’s ability to produce and deliver a 
good/service, or to communicate with its target audience as a disruptive cyber event.  This 
definition is distinct from cyber/computer exploitation that can be defined as a technique through 
which computer networks are used to infiltrate target computers' networks to extract and gather 
intelligence data.12 While certain disruptive cyber events would likely follow on from a computer 
that has been exploited, a disruptive event is different in that the attacker intends to cause 
disruption to the operations of an organization versus a compromise of data for purposes of 
criminal gain, intelligence gain, or intellectual property theft.   
 
Disruptive attacks are the focus of this paper as they are the operations that pose the most direct 
threat to the supporting infrastructure of modern society. I propose that specific types of 
disruptive attacks are more concerning than others and that those events that are most likely to 
significantly disrupt should be the focus of greater private investment and government oversight. 
While computer exploitation leading to the compromise of personal data or intellectual property 
is a significant concern, I do not address it in this paper.   
 
 
Defining cyber disruption and the dimensions for analysis 
 
While all disruptive cyber events aim to affect an organization’s ability to produce, deliver, or 
communicate with its target audience, a malicious actor may utilize multiple tactics that have 
wildly different disruptive outcomes. These events might include the deletion of data across a 
wide range of corporate networks, the destruction of physical equipment used to produce goods, 
an attempt to prevent users from reaching a website, or the denial of access to a social media 





		CISSM Working Paper | Categorizing Disruptive Cyber Activity          6
the tactics employed by the attacker and by measuring the impact of the event itself. To measure 
the impact of the disruptive event we might consider: where the event occurs in a network 
topology, the magnitude of the effect, and the length of time the disruption affects the 
organization’s operations. There are three framing questions that must be answered for any given 
disruptive event. These include: 
 
 What is the scope of the disruption? 
 What is the magnitude of the disruption? 
 What is the duration of the disruption? 
 
The scope of a disruptive event is a function of a computer network’s topology, the number of 
computers or equipment affected, and the importance of those computers to the overall network. 
While shear numbers of impacted computer systems are one factor contributing to the scope of 
the action, the importance of a specific system in that network may matter more than thousands 
of other devices. For example, corporations that use virtualization technologies to quickly scale 
and efficiently maintain their networks may find that their inability to use the high-end servers 
that provide virtual machine images to their employees has broader implications than taking 100 
client machines offline.  
 
The magnitude of a disruptive event is tied to the impact a malicious actor has on the key 
underlying services that support an organization’s key production functions. If an organization’s 
production of goods or services is tied to the deployment of labor, capital, and technology, then 
interruption of technology that enables the interaction of labor and capital is the key determinant 
of the magnitude of the event. The range of disruptive magnitude therefore is directly tied to the 
productive capacity of the underlying computer systems. For example, a computer used by 
employees to send emails and other correspondence may not be as productive as the device that 
controls automated assembly in a manufacturing plant. So while both devices have some 
productive value to the enterprise, the ability to differentiate the magnitude of impact is a key 
factor in our analysis.  
 
The duration of an event is the third dimension of our analysis. Along with the scope and 
magnitude of a disruptive event, understanding the duration of an event along with the spillover 
effects it may have on an organization’s operations is critical to differentiating between event 
types. The use of a botnet to launch a DDOS-type attack against a firm’s webserver is likely to 
last from minutes to perhaps a day. That event differs significantly from a situation in which a 
malicious actor is able to modify a control system in a manufacturing plant, potentially 
destroying physical capital and causing production slowdowns for months.  
 
It is possible in theory to specify a mathematical model that synthesizes these three dimensions 
into a single measure of cyber disruption.13 If we assume a network exists of j+n nodes we can 
combine our three dimensions of analysis for all time periods (t+m) into the following equation 




13 A detailed treatment of the derivation of the CDI can be found in the appendix to this paper. 
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We define the scope of the event by summing across all the nodes in a network and multiplying 
by importance (centrality). The magnitude of the event is the defined as, for each node, the ratio 
of the disruptive effect on a node to its productive capacity. This enables us to estimate the 
portion of production for each node that is “disabled” due to a disruptive cyber event. Finally, the 
product of the scope and magnitude is summed over time to account for the duration of the 
disruptive event. The score, or CDI, represents a single value that accounts for the three 
dimensions of analysis. That value can be used as a means of ranking events, thereby 
establishing a means of comparative analysis.  
 
While a mathematical approximation is useful conceptually, a number of practical difficulties, 
such as gaining access to highly detailed information concerning which network components are 
affected, make use of the formulation challenging. However, the structure it provides can allow 
us to approximate the scope, magnitude, and duration of an event. Figure 1 lays out a simple 
chart with the event’s scope on the x-axis, magnitude on the y-axis and duration represented by 
the size of the event marker. This allows us to use qualitative assessment (e.g. low, medium, 
high), rather than precise measurement (e.g. 10,300 computers), to broadly define the overall 
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Each class of event, while belonging to the general category of cyber disruption, requires 
differing levels of skill, access, and planning to have the intended effect. Compromising account 
passwords can be as simple as guessing user credentials, while accessing and destroying physical 
infrastructure takes significant resources, knowledge, and time.14  Breaking down event classes 
therefore is an important process to help understand and remediate vulnerabilities to important 
communications systems.  
 
 
Message manipulation: Disruption through hijacking of a user’s personal social media 
accounts  
 
Many events that are deemed “cyber attacks” are often the result of a simple compromise of a 
personal social media account. While not overly sophisticated, the ability for an attacker to 
hijack public communications of a target does have some disruptive effect as was seen in the 
January 2015 compromise of a U.S Central Command (USCENTCOM) social media account by 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). 15   
 
In this case, self-identified ISIL cyber operatives gained access to the Twitter and YouTube 
accounts used by USCENTCOM and posted messages threatening service members. The 
attackers were never inside U.S. military systems, but the large amount of publicity surrounding 
the event achieved the apparent goal of the group to leverage a cyber event to disrupt 
USCENTCOM’s normal external communications channel. The ISIL compromise was 
temporary as the site was returned to normal use within 30 minutes.16   
 
The characteristics of a Message Manipulation event include: 
 
 attacker has access to an account used for communication, but access is external to a 
victim’s corporate network; 
 no damage of critical or end-host systems; and 
 victim can easily remediate by having service provider reset password. 
 
The scope of an account hijack tends to be small or insignificant with user accounts being 
targeted and not their computers. Further, as social media accounts tend to be a service outside of 
a victim’s home network, these disruptive events are not an important node in the victim’s 
network; they are hosted by third-party providers (e.g., Facebook). These events therefore tend to 
be characterized as having a small scope relative to other types of disruptive events.  
 
The magnitude of this type of disruptive event is often small in size, as social media accounts or 
webpages can easily be recovered. The underlying data that is used to provide updates on social 
																																																								
14 Falliere, Murchu,and Chien “ W32.Stuxnet. Dossier” 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf, February 
2011. 
15 Lamothe, D “U.S military social media accounts apparently hacked by Islamic State sympathizers” , 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01/12/centcom-twitter-account-apparently-hacked-by-islamic-state-
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While account hijacking is common, it is not often associated with computer disruption. A more 
recognizable type of disruptive event is the external flood of requests to a website server, with 
the aim of overwhelming its ability to meet the demand. The result is an inability to address 
legitimate requests, leading to an error for the user. This disruptive event known as a distributed-
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack occurs thousands of times per day, across a range of 
organizations around the world.17  
 
On April 27, 2007, a local dispute surrounding the movement of a Russian war memorial 
manifested itself into a series of DDoS events on 9 different Estonian government networks. 
Seventy-five percent of the 128 DDoS events that day were resolved in an hour, yet the publicity 
surrounding the events brought accusations that the Russian government was behind the 
attacks.18  No critical government operations were impacted by the DDoS event, and it was later 
found that a private citizen with Russian sympathies was behind the event and not the Russian 
government.  
 
While the techniques associated with the execution of a DDoS event can change, its core 
characteristics include an attacker, external to an organization’s network, who floods a webserver 
or externally facing server with requests that overwhelm and prevent legitimate traffic from 
being responded to. Many DDoS attacks are small in scale and easily defeated, but increasingly 
large attacks have become more common with more than 25 attacks of 100 gigabites per second 
(Gbps) being recorded in the first quarter of 2015.19 The characteristics of external service 
disruption events include: 
 
 attackers use externally controlled systems to overwhelm a victims’ outward facing 
systems (e.g., no access to internal systems); 
 attackers attempt to deny external users access to the victim network (e.g., customers vice 
employees); and 
 attacks are often limited in duration, as system administrators and upstream Internet 
Service Providers are able to filter out attacks. 
 
The figure below highlights the structure of a DDoS attack: the command and control server, the 
network of compromised computers that generates the requests, and the victim web server.20  
 
																																																								
17 According to Arbor Networks, the global internet sees over 2,934 DDOS attacks per day. 
http://www.arbornetworks.com/resources/research/attack-map.  
18 Traynor, I “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia 
,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia, Guardian, May 2007. 
19Dunn, J “Asian Datacentre hit by massive 334 Gbps DDoS Attack, Arbor Networks reveals”, 
http://www.techworld.com/news/security/asian-datacentre-hit-by-massive-334gbps-ddos-attack-arbor-networks-reveals-
3609764/, Techworld, April 2015. 
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Internal communication disruption: Disruption of internal operations through a denial of 
service 
 
While external DDoS events target a network’s ability to communicate with external users, 
disruptive events that deny internal network communications can have a far wider impact on the 
functions of the targeted organization. A disruptive event that targets the internal operations of a 
network, thereby preventing employees from accessing e-mail, files, or other network services, 
can lead to reductions in an organization’s output, productivity, and possibly threaten long-term 
market share for its products and services. If an attacker has access to internal systems and 
denies users the ability to communicate between their computers and corporate systems (e.g., e-
mail, data servers) then operations can quickly grind to a halt. This type of event requires an 
attacker to have secured access to an internal system and, in order to achieve maximum effect, 
likely requires access to core networking infrastructure internal to the organization. While an 
attacker might aim to disrupt the greatest number of computer systems possible in an 
organization’s network, such an effect can be enabled through the execution of an attack against 
a few, highly important network devices. Characteristics of internal communications disruption 
events include: 
 
 attackers leverage internal network access to deny employee or user access to files and 
services (e.g., e-mail) but don’t affect the underlying data or equipment; 
 large numbers of computers can be rendered useless, as essential services (e.g., e-mail) 
are inaccessible; and  
 attackers are able to lock out system administrators from the network infrastructure, 
leading to significant delays in reconstituting normal operations. 
 
While not as prevalent as DDoS events, internal denial of service events can and have occurred, 
usually with much greater effect. One such event impacted the operations of several financial 
and media organizations. On March 20, 2013, three South Korean television stations and several 
banks suffered problems with their internal computer systems, along with problems interacting 
with ATMs and mobile payment systems.25  The attack consisted of several well-orchestrated 
events, including an external DDoS, deletion of data, and blocking of traffic between internal 
systems.26  While denying access to external websites and deleting data from internal computers 
(discussed in the next section) is concerning, blocking information between internal systems can 
significantly magnify the impact an attacker has by denying access to corporate systems that 
serve an important function. In the case of the South Korean event, employees were unable to 
access internal files, e-mail access was denied for workers, and ATMs were unable to 
communicate with bank internal systems, thereby denying bank customers’ access to monies in 
their accounts.   
 
																																																								
25 Sang-hun, C “Computer Networks in South Korea are Paralayzed in Cyberattacks”,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html, New York Times, March 2013; 
Krebs, “The case for North Korea’s role in Sony hack”, http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/dark-seoul/, Krebs Security Blog, 
December 2014. 
26 Symantec, “Four Years of Dark Seoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War”, 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-
war, Symantec Security Blog, June 2013. 
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The scope of these types of events tends to be fairly large as network traffic is impeded through 
the attacker’s compromise of core networking systems. While an attacker might only maintain 
access to a few computer systems in a larger network, if those systems are central in importance 
to a network’s function (e.g., the router) then the scope of the disruption is greatly magnified.  
For example, if an attacker maintains access to a core router or switch in an organization’s 
network, he now has the ability to disable computer packets from traversing through that system. 
While users of other computer systems are still able to access their local files and programs, any 
attempt to access systems distributed in that network or on the internet are prevented (e.g., 
websites on the internet or files on a file server). In the Korean disruptive event, only a handful 
of important systems including domain controllers, e-mail servers, and file servers were 
compromised by the attacker, but disruptions to those systems impacted employees and 
customers who were unable to access files, e-mail, and even cash from their accounts.27 
Therefore, these types of cyber events tend to have a larger scope than a simple compromise of a 
social media account or even a large-scale DDoS of a webserver.      
 
The magnitude of these types of events tends to range from moderate to severe, as attackers 
leverage access to internal network devices to push disruptions across the organization’s 
operations. While information on end-host computers are not deleted or destroyed, the inability 
to access data from internal and external sources prevents employees from accessing needed 
information or in some cases disrupts the control systems of manufacturing processes all 
together. As the attacker’s objective is to control central network systems, the secondary effect 
often leads to large numbers of internal computers unable to access vital corporate systems, 
including access to e-mail, files, or the internet.28 In large organizations that centralize control 
systems for inventory or manufacturing systems, denying computers the ability to communicate 
with one another can cause the shut down of production all together. In the case of the Korean 
event, the inability of ATM machines to communicate with bank servers precluded customers’ 
withdrawing cash.   
 
Internal disruption of service events tend to last longer than those that originate from external 
sources. While DDoS events can often be filtered by upstream Internet Service Providers (ISP) 
or by system administrators, internal denial of service events are often more difficult to address, 
as the devices causing the disruption are both internal and under the control of the attacker. 
Often, the account passwords are changed, locking out IT personnel and making it difficult for 
the system administrator to regain control and recover. This type of disruptive event can take 
days, weeks, and sometimes months to fully recover. In Korea, system administrators spent days 
wrestling control back of their internal systems and spent months addressing the long-term 
impacts of the disruptive event.29   
 
Leveraging our analytic framework to the events surrounding the Korean banks, we find that the 
scope of the event was high, as several key network appliances (file shares, e-mail, etc) were 
impacted. Further, the magnitude of the event was high as employees were not able to access 
files and e-mail, and customers were unable to withdraw funds. Lastly, while the event was 
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 the duration of disruptive event is longer as network administrators require time to 
recover data and replace hardware; and 
 the recovery of all data lost is not guaranteed.  
 
 
In November 2014, the Sony Corporation experienced a severe disruptive event when large 
portions of its network was taken down and made inoperable.30 First disclosed on a Reddit 
posting, the event deleted most of the organization’s computers’ system and user files.31 An 
organization known as the “Guardians of the Peace” (GoP). with suspected ties to the North 
Korean government, was implicated in the attack.32 The event combined different tactics: 
stealing possibly 100 terabytes of data, including email and files, in an attempt to embarrass 
officials; deletion and encryption of system files from almost 7,000 end-host machines; and 
compromise of core network appliances, including the mail server and file shares, to help 
propagate the attack tool set.33 The company was left without use of e-mail, voicemail, or access 
to files resident on its computers.34 The use of multiple techniques to access, propagate, and 
execute the disruptive event impeded operations at Sony for months.35  
 
During a data attack, the scope of encryption and deletion varies from a single computer to most 
of the end hosts resident in a network. Criminals who leverage encryption to demand payment in 
exchange for returning data to the user often deploy a single-use disruptive payload. So-called 
ransomware is often used with targets of opportunity rather than as part of a deliberate campaign. 
However, attackers can leverage deep access in a target network to push their malicious code to 
as many computers as possible and then synchronize their execution to elicit maximum effect. In 
the case of the Sony event, the GoP modified thousands of computers and encrypted contents 
across most of the corporate network. This allowed the GoP to significantly impact the 
productivity of thousands of company employees.      
 
The magnitude of encryption or deletion events vary based on the number and types of 
computers impacted by attackers. Whereas denying access to files on an email server can cause a 
temporary problem, it also has the possibility of permanently destroying data or making the 
underlying computer system inoperable.36 In the Sony case, the loss of local files across 
thousands of targeted machines, along with the intentional encryption of file shares dramatically 
																																																								
30  Infosec Institute,  “Cyber attack on Sony Pictures is much more than a data breach”, 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cyber-attack-sony-pictures-much-data-breach/, Infosec Institute, December 2014. 
31 Ibid 
32 Finkle, J “FBI warns of destructive malware in wake of Sony attack”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/02/us-sony-
cybersecurity-malware-idUSKCN0JF3FE20141202, Reuters, December 2014. 
33 http://www.businessinsider.com/the-sony-hackers -still-have-a-massive-amount-of-data-that-hasnt-been-leaked-yet-2014-12; 
Cieply and Barnes “Sony Cyberattacks, First a Nuisance, Swiftly Grew into a Firestorm”,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/business/media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisance-swiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html?_r=0, New 
York Times, December 2014.  
34 Ibid 
35 Pagliery, J “What caused the Sony hack: What we know now”, http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/24/technology/security/sony-
hack-facts/, CNN, December 2014. 
36 Malware Bytes “Cryptolocker Ransomware: What you need to know”,  
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Equipment attack: Disruption through critical infrastructure and control networks 
 
Thus far our discussions have primarily dealt with disruptive cyber events that target the 
communications path or the data residing on computer systems. While denying access to 
websites, file servers, or even the data itself can severely disrupt an organization’s operations, 
the ability to remotely modify physical equipment such that it is rendered useless represents a 
significant escalation. Use of network access to destroy physical equipment demonstrates an 
ability to cross a boundary between the cyber and physical worlds, highlighting a vulnerability to 
the underlying systems that support modern life. While rare, these types of events are often seen 
by countries as acts of sabotage and could be met with retaliation by conventional means. 
Executions of these attacks usually require deep access to target networks, familiarity with 
underlying control systems, and significant resources.40 The characteristics of equipment attack 
events include: 
 
 attackers leverage internal access to networks to modify control systems; 
 the impact to physical equipment can have sustained effect on the production of products; 
and 
 the resulting impact of tends to be long, as physical equipment needs to be replaced and 
changes need to be made to the underlying network infrastructure.  
 
In December 2014, a German Federal Office for Information Security report noted the 
infiltration and destruction of equipment at one of the country’s steel mills.41 The event, noted to 
be only the second confirmed industrial control system attack, appeared to leverage remote 
access by an unknown actor in the corporate network to modify the control systems, causing a 
blast furnace to overheat and eventually be destroyed.42 While technical details concerning the 
event have yet to be released by the German government, the physical destruction of plant 
equipment was estimated to impact the ability of the organization to maintain levels of 
production prior to the event. Replacement of damaged equipment is likely to take months due to 
the need to remove and replace large pieces of machinery.43  
 
The scope of this type of event is slightly different than some of the other events we have 
discussed earlier. In previous examples, we looked primarily at the importance of computer 
systems to the operations of a network and/or to the number of end-hosts impacted. In this type 
of event, the damage migrates outside of a corporate network to the physical environment. The 
scope might be more limited than an internal communications disruption or data destruction 
event, as fewer central network nodes are impacted. In the case of the disruption of the German 
steel mill, the corporate network was not disrupted (although it was used as an access channel), 
but the physical capital connected to that network was impacted.   
 
																																																								
40 Falliere, Murchu,and Chien “ W32.Stuxnet. Dossier” 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf, February 
2011. 
41 BBC,  “Hack attack causes massive damage at steel works”, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30575104, BBC, December 
2014.  
42 SANS Institute, “ICS CP/PE Case study Paper “German Steel Mill Attack”, https://ics.sans.org/media/ICS-CPPE-case-Study-
2-German-Steelworks_Facility.pdf, SANS Institute, December 2014.  
43 Ibid 
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The magnitude of an equipment attack event is directly related to the productive capacity of the 
number and importance of equipment destroyed or impeded. For example, disruption to a control 
system that manages the dimming of lights in an office is not as impactful as the destruction of 
large power generators at a local power utility, which affects the level of power on the grid. 
While an internal communications disruption or data attack event causes production outages 
through the indirect effect of denying access to communications or data, an equipment attack 
event destroys the factor of production directly. In the case of the German steel mill, the 
magnitude of the event is a function of the productive value of the furnace that was destroyed. 
News reports have indicated that the destroyed furnace was directly involved in the operations of 
the mill and can be assumed to be highly valuable to the organization.   
 
The duration of an equipment attack event is likely to be longer than other types of disruptive 
attacks, as physical equipment is rendered inoperable. While some physical equipment can be 
easily replaced, in some cases, specialty equipment takes months if not years to fully replace. In 
the German steel mill example, the destruction of a blast furnace required the removal of the 
damaged capital, shipment of new equipment, and time by mechanics and operators to install and 
bring online a new furnace. Disruptive events that target the equipment that underpin large-scale 
manufacturing, utilities, or service provision will no doubt take longer to recover from than 
simple message manipulation or external service disruption events, and most likely longer than 
internal communications disruption and IV attacks.  
 
Disruptive events targeting physical infrastructure or machinery are often seen as the most 
dangerous type of disruptive event. Leveraging the approach laid out in this paper, we find that 
the events surrounding the attack against the German Steel Mill are higher in scope than a DDoS 
event, but may not be as great as what we found with the attack against the Sony Corporation. 
However, as the attacker was able to infiltrate the control systems of a furnace vital to the 
production process, the magnitude of the event may be rated as high. Lastly, the duration of this 
event is likely to extend to several months as new equipment must be ordered and installed. We 
can plot this event with a medium to high scope along with a high magnitude and a duration that 
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Disruption Type Scope Magnitude Duration 
Message 
Manipulation 














 Dark Seoul DoS 
Moderate 
(Dozens of Central 
Computers 
Systems) 
Moderate to High Weeks to Months 
Data Attack 




High Months (1-4) 
Equipment Attack 
German Steel Mill 
Moderate-High 
(Small Number of 
Key Controllers of 
Physical 
Equipment) 
High Months (6+) 
 
Table 1: Comparative Table of Disruptive Cyber Events 
We can also visually represent the disruptive effect by plotting each event along two axes. In the 
figure below, we plot each of the examples along two axis representing the scope and magnitude 
of the cyber disruption. The duration of each event is denoted by the size of the event marker.  
Of the five events, the compromise of the CENTCOM social media presence and the DDoS of 
Estonian Government websites are small in scale and carry a limited magnitude in the operations 
of the target. Further, the duration of both events is largely measured in hours thereby having a 
limited total disruptive effect. Conversely, the attacks against the Sony Corporation, the “Dark 
Seoul” events, and the attack against the German steel mill significantly impact the target 
organizations. The larger scope, higher levels of magnitude, and longer duration make these 
events more disruptive than the previous two. This approach visualizes the total disruptive effect 
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Protecting against all categories will require leveraging different defensive strategies, including 
the installation of hardware and software defense systems, changing network topologies, and 
limiting access to the most sensitive systems in the organization. By breaking down threats to a 
system into categories, an organization is able to develop a more comprehensive assessment of 
its vulnerabilities to a complete range of disruptive scenarios.  
 
 
Estimating the social consequences of disruptive cyber events 
 
While organizations can leverage the framework identified in this paper, this approach has limits. 
The most apparent is its inability to capture the broader social consequences of specific 
disruptions, a topic that is of great interest to policy makers. Visually representing disruptive 
effects from an organization’s perspective is useful, however, it does not give policy makers an 
understanding of the relative effect each type of event has on society at large. Disruptive events 
aimed at critical infrastructure or at systemically important institutions not only affect the 
operating organization, they also induce additional impacts on dependent industries. For 
example, the destruction of production equipment at a large tire manufacturing plant could delay 
the production of cars at another company. In extreme situations, the loss of productive capacity 
might lead to the temporary layoff of employees, reducing household incomes in the locality and 
also tax revenues.  The output reduction at the tire manufacturer might also lead to less demand 
for raw materials thereby impacting suppliers. These secondary effects are the broader social 
impacts that policy makers have to understand in order to assess which industries impose large 
social costs and merit comprehensive oversight in implementing cyber defenses.  
 
By slightly modifying the CDI framework, a policy maker can assess the social disruption of a 
cyber event. If two separate organizations are the victim of a significant disruptive cyber event 
that affects their production systems, their self-assessed CDI might be similar (see top two 
graphs in Figure 8). Yet for a policy maker, it is insufficient to simply know the impact of the 
events on the organization itself; additional questions would remain concerning the broader 
consequences of the events on the whole of society. For example, if the first organization was a 
factory that manufactured toy dolls and the second was a power generation plant, a different 
societal impact could be expected based on the connections between the affected organizations 
and other entities. The doll manufacturer is unlikely to have significant connections to other 
firms, while a power plant could have significant linkages. In other words, the attack on the 
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Our first element of analysis is simply a count of the number of vertices impacted by a disruptive 
event. If we evaluate a hypothetical disruptive event that impacts vertices J, J+1, and J+2 on the 
topology in Figure 1 then we can quick determine that 3 nodes in a topology of 9 was impacted 
or roughly 33% of the network’s topology was affected.  A large scale event that disables the 
functions of 33% of a network’s devices will no doubt have a significant effect on a firm’s 
operations. 
 
Yet while the sheer number of vertices is important the location and connections a vertex 
maintains can yield even greater disruption to network operations. If all vertices required access 
to the internet then even disruption to a single node (e.g vertex J) would deny all vertices access 
to the internet. To understand those relationships, we would need to understand both the 
importance of impacted vertices have on paths between one point and another (betweenness) in a 
network as well as for how central (centrality) those nodes are in the network.  
 
Topology: Understanding the importance of a node to a network 
 
Aside from the number of nodes impacted the importance of each node to a network also 
important to understand. How “central” a vertex is to an affected topology might demonstrate an 
ability for a disruptive event to segment a network and cutoff other nodes from communicating 
with each other.  For example, a simple visual analysis of Figure 1 would yield a conclusion that 
node J+8 is less central to the graph G then node J+1. This would imply that a disruptive event 
that hits only J+8 would have a smaller scope of disruption then if node J+1 were impacted.  
While it is entirely possible that the productive activities of node J+8 are extremely high44, the 
breadth of the disruption is still likely to be smaller due its lower degree of centrality in the 
network. While there are many measures of centrality in a network, the calculation of 
Eigenvector centrality45 is useful to understand the relative importance a specific node has within 
a network.  While the specific calculation of nodal centrality is beyond the scope of this paper, 
the concept is important as a distinguishing element of the topology of disruption and useful in 
constructing a measure of scope and for a larger measure of cyber disruption. 
 
Topology: Compiling a Disruptive Event’s Scope 
 
There are two fundamental elements in our measurement of the scope of a disruptive cyber 
event. The number and importance of nodes affected by the actions of a malicious actor help us 
quantify the range of effect on the targeted network. These concepts can be expressed 
mathematically with the following equation: 
 
	 	 	 	  
	 
	 	 	 	 	 46	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 , 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
																																																								
44 A high level of centrality does not imply it is more important than a lower amount, but does indicate a more centralized 
position in the topology. Discussion of magnitude of impact is handled later in the paper.  
45 Insert citation 
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The number of nodes affected, their dependent relationships with one another, and the centrality 
of the nodes affected all contribute to the scope of a disruptive event. While the breadth of a 
disruptive event is a critical determinant for evaluation, it is closely coupled with the magnitude 
of the individual impacts for each vertices in a topology, and the subsequent duration of a 
disruption. In the following section of this paper I address an approach to measure the relative 
magnitude of disruption on a specific node and its impact to capital deployed by an organization 
for purposes of production.       
 
 
Magnitude: How Large is the Disruption? 
 
In the previous section we discussed the scope of a disruptive cyber event including estimating 
the number, relationships, and position of impacted nodes. However, scope alone is insufficient 
to categorize the specific types of events faced by firms and governments.  To gain a better 
appreciation of the relative scale of the malicious activity we must be able to pair both the scope 
of the event with the magnitude across affected nodes. In principal there are several 
considerations we must deal with when estimating the magnitude of cyber disruptive event. 
These might include the effect on the perception of the firm or its brand by the public or the 
impact to future sales resulting from concerns surrounding the ability of a firm to make good on 
its commitments.  While these considerations are important and have been dealt with by others, 
fundamentally, the effect of an event must be tied to the ability of an organization to produce a 
good or service. It is this last estimate of direct impact that this paper addresses.  
 
Magnitude:  Defining the central concern of the enterprise 
 
While the magnitude of cyber disruption can be assessed through external measures (e.g effect 
on stock price), the central concerns surrounding disruptive cyber events are the effects to 
production and the underlying productive capacity of a firm’s technology. While media accounts 
of basement hackers making there way into networks for the purpose of  marking up public 
accounts or websites, the central concerns of boardrooms and executives must center around the 
production of goods and services. We might find the following questions asked by senior 
business leaders:  
 
 How many tons of steel will not be produced because a network is not working? 
 How will customers be able to place orders if the company’s website is 
unavailable?  
 Can I manage my inventory when my internal systems are unavailable? 
 Can I run my operations if my data servers are off line? 
 
These questions go to the heart of concerns regarding disruptive events--Can goods and services 
be produced and distributed after a disruptive event has occurred? To help frame this problem it 
is useful to anchor our analysis as part of a firm’s production function. Basic microeconomics 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
46 Eigenvector Centrality calculation is equal to , 1,  
Where: 	 	 	 	 , 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  the centrality people is tied to, R is the adjacency 
matrix, I is the identity matrix, and 1 is a matrix of all ones.  
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defines the production of a good as the combination of labor and capital to produce a good. In 
the case where L is considered units of labor and K is considered units of capital, they are 
brought together using technology, ∅, to produce some level of output.  
 
∅ ∗ ,  
 
If the value of technology (∅) is greater than one than the production function exhibits increasing 
returns to scale, decreasing returns to scale if less than one, and constant returns to scale if equal 
to one.   Yet what if a malicious actor were able to penetrate a computer network that links 
capital equipment (e.g production robots in a car manufacturer) and shuts down the connection 
between those pieces of equipment, can technology’s contribution to the production function 
itself be impacted?  In the case of a cyber disruption event, I propose that the underlying 
technology that integrates the factors of production is affected thereby reducing the contribution 
of technology in the production process and lowering overall output.  
 
Magnitude: Impacting production 
 
Technology is primarily thought to improve efficiencies and to enable labor and capital 
equipment to work together in an integrated manner to produce goods, but if that technology 
were disrupted then it can no longer be seen to add to the efficient deployment of the factors of 
production. In fact the widespread disabling of key network devices or software applications can 
slow down or completely stop the production process.  It follows then as the productive value of 
technology used by a firm approaches zero, production of a firm’s good also approaches zero.   
 
If the technology of a firm prior to an event is defined as	∅, and the value of technology affect on 
production after an event is defined as ∅∗ ,where	∅	>	∅ ∗  , then it follows that as ∅∗falls as a 
result of a disruptive event then output ( ) itself is reduced. This reduction can be thought of as 
the aggregated effect of a cyber disruption on the underlying productive capacity of a firm’s 
technology. 
 
	∅∗ ∅  it follows that 	 ∗  
 
 
While it is easy to tie the aggregated effect of technology to production, the reality is that 
technology is disaggregated and networked across disparate geographies often consisting of 
thousands of connections. These interconnections often tie together disparate nodes each with 
differing contributions to the production of goods and services. In a network consisting of 
thousands of computing devices the processes required to manufacture or produce a product each 
have disparate productive topologies that when affected by a malicious cyber event lead to 
differing impacts. Those changes to the productive capacity of the underlying technology must 
be addressed to accurately approximate the impact an even has on the firm.   
 
Magnitude: Disaggregating effect of technology on production 
 
Our ability to discern the magnitude of an event is tied to the disruption of the underlying 
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So for a single node j in our topology, and recalling where ∅ is equal to the overall value of 
technology used in production, the productive value technology from all nodes j is equal to the 
overall value of technology applied in the production process. 48 
 
∅ ∅  
 
While each node of technology in a topology contains a value of productive capacity for the 
production of goods, the introduction of a disruptive cyber event highlights a need for us to also 
account for the cost of that disruption to the application of technology in the firm’s production 
process.  Any disruptive event on a node in our network will have some impact that will range 
from zero to the total value of the PCT for that point in our topology. Therefore let us define a 
disruptive event on that point of technology (e.g a computer workstation is rendered useless) the 





So for each individual node in our network the true productive contribution it provides to a 
firm’s production is the difference between the overall PCT and the DET.  So the share of 





	 	 	 	 	 	  
0,1 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1 	 	 	 	 0  
	 	 	 	 	 	  
 
We can discern that as when an event occurs  (e.g E=1) on a node, and as the value of DET 
increases, the contribution to a firm’s production for this point in our topology approaches zero. 
As both the impact of the event and the number of nodes impacted by the event grows the larger 
the impact to the firm’s production, as more and more machines are rendered useless. Likewise 
the disruption to an exceptionally important node (e.g File server or industrial control system) 
also have a wide ranging effect on the firm’s production despite only a small number of nodes 
impacted.    
 
We are then able to discern the impact of a disruptive cyber event Therefore the cumulative 
effect of a disruptive event on a topology consisting of nodes, can   
 
																																																								
48 While this paper only deals with a simple summation for the productive capacity of each node of technology, more complex 
interrelationships are likely to exists for differing industries and firms. 
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During normal operating where no disruptive cyber event has occurred, the full productive 
capacity of the node can be applied. When a disruptive event occurs however, the productive 
capacity is reduced by some amount as a direct result of the malicious actors intentions. For 
example, lets assume a computer at ACME company controls an assembly line’s operations 
utilizing both a custom software application to manage production, but also leveraging an 
inventory system that is reliant on Internet access. Senior leadership have been told by their IT 
security team that an disruptive event could occur using a known vulnerability that could impact 
inventory control systems. That impact would reduce the productive capacity of that single 
computer by 0.5.  During the course of its normal operations a single node j’s productive 
capacity of technology (PCT) is equal to one, and since no event has occurred the value for E at 
that time is zero. Our the calculation of ∅  is straightforward: 
 
∅ ∗  
∅ 1 0 ∗ 0.5 
∅ 1 
 
Now assume a malicious actor gained access and denied the ability for node j to reach the 
internet, such that an operator could not use his computer to access the inventory control system, 
but still allowed control of the assembly line. While production can continue through control of 
an assembly line, greater inefficiencies are introduced, as inventory is not properly controlled. 
This leads to a reduction in productive capacity for the node thereby reducing optimum 
production for the firm. In an extreme case production is halted until all the systems are brought 
back on line, but here only a portion of the computer’s productive capacity is affected. If we 
assume then that the normal productive capacity for node j is one, but with a disruptive cyber 
event (g), the effect on that node is 0.5 we find that the new ∅∗:  
 
∅∗ ∗  
∅∗ 1 1 ∗ 0.5  
∅∗ 0.5 
 
Running the same exercise on all affected nodes (e.g the scope of the event) and summing the 
results and dividing over the baseline ∅ provides us an estimate of the fractional productive 
capacity for all nodes in the network as compared to the baseline prior to the disruptive cyber 
event. 
 








The result of the disruptive cyber event is to reduce the value of ∅  to ∅∗ thereby reducing the 
productive capacity of the deployed technology and disrupting the ability of labor and capital to 
work together.  
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∗ ∅ , ∅ ,  
 
This reduces the firm’s overall output from its optimum baseline capability and provides us with 
two outputs of a disruptive cyber event: change in productive capacity of technology, and the 
change in output due to a disruptive cyber event. 
 








	 	 	 	 1  
	 	 1  
 
	 	  
Duration:  How Long will the Disruption Last? 
 
The duration of a disruptive cyber event is the length of time an action is taken by a malicious 
actor impacts the operations of an organization. Some events might only disrupt a network 
device for a few minutes or hours, while others destroy equipment that is either very expensive 
or hard to procure resulting in a larger impact. For example, distributed denial of service attacks 
occur thousands of times per day, but are often easily addressed by either Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) or the company system administrators in a manner of a few hours. Events that 
attack and destroy industrial equipment can have profound impacts to production as it may take 
weeks or months to replace damaged equipment.  
 
Calculating an Index for Cyber Disruption 
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